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#+BEGIN_SRC text BLOCK A — Disambiguation and next steps from your shorthand list

A. Likely entity map • “Modal labs but in tee” → Concept: Modal-style serverless GPU jobs, but each function runs inside a hardware-attested enclave. Use AWS Nitro Enclaves or Azure/GCP confidential computing to get isolation and remote attestation. Modal AWS Docs GCP Docs Microsoft Docs

• “Centralized cluster” → A managed enclave cluster with attested schedulers and a trust gateway that only releases keys to measured workloads. Start with parent EC2 hosts that launch Nitro Enclaves or with Azure/GCP confidential VMs. AWS Docs Microsoft Docs GCP Docs

• “Ora sold to web 3 / Webai” → ORA Protocol is an on-chain AI oracle and zkOracle stack for verifiable inference. “webAI” could mean the browser-side Web AI program or the private-AI vendor webAI; keep both in view depending on context. ORA Docs Chrome Dev Web AI webAI

• “Zk cloud” → ZK proof infra as a service for generation and verification. Candidate: ZkCloud and similar proving clouds. ZkCloud

• “Helix nano” → HelixNano, mRNA platform company. If this is partnership-oriented, think bio data governance plus enclave analytics or zk attestations around assay outputs. HelixNano

• “Seth lotd” → Likely Seth Lloyd, MIT quantum information scientist whose public outreach includes quantum biology commentary. MIT MechE profile

• “Dave andre / asmaue / Blake / Shielded bob harley / Tupmas mak” → Ambiguous placeholders or people. Recommend we keep as private contact codenames until you confirm identities to avoid misattribution in docs. Modal AWS Docs

B. “Modal in a TEE” minimal architecture Goal: serverless UX with enclave-grade confidentiality. Each function image is measured, attested, and receives short-lived keys only if the measurement matches policy. Networking is brokered by a proxy that enforces egress allow-lists and signs audit receipts. AWS Docs Microsoft Docs Intel Docs

Key components

Attested launcher: parent VM boots with measured kernel and launches enclaves. 2) Attestation service: verifies quotes and binds KMS keys to enclave measurements. 3) Function registry: stores approved measurements and policies. 4) Data plane: enclave-only TLS with attestation-bound identities. 5) Audit plane: immutable logs for who ran what, with which policy. AWS Docs GCP Docs Intel Docs

Threats to handle Side channels and traffic analysis, egress exfiltration, replayed attestations, stale measurements, and developer ergonomics that tempt policy downgrades. Use sealed secrets, nonce-based session keys, egress proxies, and CI that fails builds when measurement drifts from policy. AWS Docs Microsoft Docs

C. Interop with Web3 and ZK Pattern A: enclave does private compute off-chain, produces a succinct ZK proof or attestation receipt that a verifier checks on-chain. Pattern B: route to ORA’s OAO when you need verifiable on-chain inference rather than raw enclave trust. Pattern C: use a proving cloud for heavy circuits while keeping secrets inside enclaves until outputs are minimized. ORA Docs ZkCloud Intel Docs

D. Quick action items you can green-light • Draft a one-pager “Serverless in a TEE” that shows user journey, attestation handshake, and KMS key-release policy. Cite AWS Nitro Enclaves and GCP/Azure Confidential VM docs. AWS Docs GCP Docs Microsoft Docs

• Vendor touchpoints: ask ORA for an OAO demo with a small in-model, plus an attested off-chain preprocessor that emits a proof or receipt you can verify. ORA Docs

• If “webAI” means browser-resident models for a front end, align on WebGPU/WebNN and privacy posture before sending any data to the enclave back end. If it means the vendor webAI, request their deployment and on-prem stack docs. Chrome Dev Web AI webAI

E. Triage table for your notes

| Your shorthand | Likely target | What to do next | |---------------------------------------+--------------------------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Modal labs but in tee | Serverless-in-enclave platform | Draft attestation flow and egress policy. Pick AWS Nitro or GCP/Azure to start. | | Centralized cluster | Managed confidential compute cluster | Define trust boundary and KMS policy. | | Ora sold to web 3 / Webai | ORA on-chain AI, Web AI client or vendor | Book demo and define proof or attest artifacts you accept. | | Zk cloud | ZK proving infra | Scope which circuits move to ZK vs enclave. | | Helix nano | mRNA therapeutics company | Clarify if this is a data-collab partner idea. | | Seth lotd | Seth Lloyd | If outreach, anchor on quantum information and systems links. |

Modal AWS Docs GCP Docs Microsoft Docs ORA Docs ZkCloud HelixNano MIT MechE profile

If you want, I can turn this into a 1-page brief and a simple attestation-sequence diagram for the “Modal in a TEE” concept. AWS Docs Intel Docs #+END_SRC

#+BEGIN_SRC text BLOCK A — Private A2A multi-agent collaboration: CCVM architecture, workflows, and go-to-market

Premise and target You want a privacy-preserving Agent-to-Agent protocol where isolated compute nodes collaborate on secrets without revealing underlying data or model IP, with healthcare “logic marketplace,” private procurement, cross-border lending, and personal data-vault use cases. Silence Labs’ positioning around MPC and privacy-preserving compute is a direct fit and gives us credible vendor anchors. Silence Laboratories Silent Compute. oai_citation:0‡Silence Laboratories

Trust model in one box Each org runs a local Cryptographic Computing VM (CCVM) that exposes A2A endpoints. CCVMs are attested TEEs or Confidential VMs. Data leaves an org only as encrypted shares, proofs, or minimal results. Keys are released to a workload only if attestation verifies the expected measurement and policy. AWS Nitro + KMS attestation GCP Confidential VM Azure Confidential Computing. oai_citation:1‡AWS Documentation oai_citation:2‡Google Cloud oai_citation:3‡Microsoft Learn

Wire-level handshake (A2A-CCVM)

Channel: TLS 1.3 mTLS between CCVMs. 2) Remote attestation: each CCVM presents a signed attestation; peers verify and pin policy. 3) Key grant: KMS releases per-session keys only to verified measurements. 4) Compute: MPC or FHE on ciphertexts; optional ZK proof for verifiability. 5) Result: return minimal outputs plus receipts. RFC 8446 AWS attestation setup Pragmatic MPC OpenFHE. oai_citation:4‡IETF Datatracker oai_citation:5‡AWS Documentation oai_citation:6‡securecomputation.org oai_citation:7‡openfhe.org

Primitive inventory • MPC for joint logic on sharded secrets (PSI, joins, risk scores). • FHE for unilateral compute with minimal round trips. • ZK to prove policy compliance or model provenance. • TEE for low-latency, policy-gated execution with KMS-bound keys. Pick per task by latency, bandwidth, and trust. Pragmatic MPC OpenFHE GCP Confidential VM. oai_citation:8‡securecomputation.org oai_citation:9‡openfhe.org oai_citation:10‡Google Cloud

Identity and consent rails for agents Use DIDs for org and agent identifiers, WebAuthn for user-side strong auth, and consent receipts bound to CCVM measurements. Outputs carry signed policy receipts that verifiers can check later. W3C DID Core WebAuthn L2. oai_citation:11‡W3C

Healthcare “logic marketplace” Vendors publish reviewed “logic packs” (e.g., risk score, triage, QC). Providers keep PHI local. CCVM+MPC executes pack against local EMR snapshots and partner datasets, returning only scores and audit receipts. De-identification guardrails align with HIPAA Safe Harbor or expert determination. HHS Safe Harbor eCFR 164.514. oai_citation:12‡HHS.gov oai_citation:13‡eCFR

Private procurement and e-commerce Automate price and terms discovery without revealing supplier costs or buyer demand history. Use MPC PSI for catalog overlap, MPC auctions for clearing price, and optional ZK attestations for compliance. Pactum shows the category is ready for automation; you add cryptographic privacy. Axios on Pactum Pragmatic MPC. oai_citation:14‡Axios oai_citation:15‡securecomputation.org

Secure cross-border lending (retail and SME) Bank A computes credit features jointly with Bank B’s local transaction signals without exporting raw data. Results are signed by CCVMs. Regulators can verify policy receipts. Stablecoin rails settle micro-fees for models and data access, with on-chain verification if needed via ORA. ORA OAO GCP Confidential VM RFC 8446. oai_citation:16‡docs.ora.io oai_citation:17‡Google Cloud oai_citation:18‡IETF Datatracker

Personal data vault and “best-intro” service A user-controlled vault authorizes an agent via WebAuthn and DID. The agent runs PSI-style “who can intro me to X” across contact graphs in CCVMs and returns just the shortest intro path with consent metadata, never the raw address books. WebAuthn L2 W3C DID Core. oai_citation:19‡W3C

“Bring your memory” without exposure Your agent keeps embeddings and episodic memory inside your CCVM. Cross-org collaboration uses ZK or MPC to compute only the relevance or price of that memory, not its content. Payment and access receipts move via ORA where verifiability matters. ORA OAO OpenFHE. oai_citation:20‡docs.ora.io oai_citation:21‡openfhe.org

Reputation and “USID” verification Bind reputations to DIDs, not emails. For biometric verification use on-device WebAuthn authenticators so biometrics never leave the device; CCVMs verify attested public-key assertions, not faceprints. WebAuthn L2 W3C DID Core. oai_citation:22‡W3C

Platform layout you can ship Control plane: policy registry, attestation verifier, KMS key-release, audit log. Data plane: CCVM nodes on AWS Nitro, GCP CVM, or Azure CC. Compute: MPC/FHE/TEE selectable per task. Proof plane: optional ZK or ORA receipts for external verifiers. AWS KMS attestation GCP Confidential VM Azure CC. oai_citation:23‡AWS Documentation oai_citation:24‡Google Cloud oai_citation:25‡Microsoft Learn

MVP in 4 sprints S1: A2A TLS 1.3 + attestation + per-session key grant. S2: PSI-join demo between two CCVMs with audit receipts. S3: Logic pack runner for healthcare de-identified table. S4: Procurement auction with pact-style agent loop and ZK receipt of policy compliance. RFC 8446 HHS Safe Harbor Pragmatic MPC ORA OAO. oai_citation:26‡IETF Datatracker oai_citation:27‡HHS.gov oai_citation:28‡securecomputation.org oai_citation:29‡docs.ora.io

KPIs to prove value Privacy: zero plaintext egress events by design. Performance: median A2A job p95 < 1 s for PSI-size N≤50k. Economics: procurement savings uplift ≥ 2 percent vs baseline. Compliance: 100 percent runs produce verifiable receipts. Silent Compute GCP Confidential VM. oai_citation:30‡Silence Laboratories oai_citation:31‡Google Cloud

Sequence sketch of the A2A-CCVM handshake #+END_SRC #+BEGIN_mermaid sequenceDiagram participant A as Agent A (CCVM_A) participant B as Agent B (CCVM_B) participant K as KMS_A A->>B: mTLS(TLS 1.3) connect + request attestation B—>>A: Attestation doc (measurement, policy hash) A->>K: Verify B attestation + request session key for policy P K—>>A: Session key sealed to B’s measurement + policy P A->>B: MPC/FHE job start (inputs sharded or encrypted) B—>>A: Minimal result + audit receipt + optional ZK proof A—>>B: Payment receipt (stablecoin or off-chain) #+END_mermaid RFC 8446 AWS attestation setup Pragmatic MPC OpenFHE. oai_citation:32‡IETF Datatracker oai_citation:33‡AWS Documentation oai_citation:34‡securecomputation.org oai_citation:35‡openfhe.org

Next actions

Book a joint working session with Silence to align on CCVM threat model and attestation formats. 2) Stand up two CCVM nodes on your preferred cloud to demo PSI and logic packs. 3) For healthcare, pre-register a Safe Harbor de-ID protocol and log all CCVM policy receipts for audits. Silence Laboratories HHS Safe Harbor Azure CC. oai_citation:39‡Silence Laboratories oai_citation:40‡HHS.gov oai_citation:41‡Microsoft Learn

#+BEGIN_SRC text BLOCK A — Ethereum “private A2A + real-time zkVM at L1” notes you can paste into a deck

What the targets mean in numbers “Giga-gas L1” = ~1,000,000,000 gas/s. With ~100k gas/tx, that’s ~10k TPS at L1; L2 aggregate goals push to tera-gas/s. These figures match the “Lean Ethereum” vision framing and media recaps. EthDaily. oai_citation:0‡ethdaily.io

Mechanisms that make “verify fast, scale hard” plausible

Enshrined PBS (EIP-7732) separates block building from proposing to improve liveness and MEV handling. 2) Delayed Execution (EIP-7886) lets validators attest to statically verifiable blocks without full execution on the critical path, opening headroom for higher gas limits. 3) A protocol-level per-transaction gas cap (EIP-7825) reduces DoS surface if aggregate limits rise. Together: verify quickly, execute deterministically, keep gossip latencies low. EIP-7732 EIP-7886 EIP-7825 Delayed-Exec explainer. oai_citation:1‡Ethereum Improvement Proposals oai_citation:2‡nerolation.github.io

Latency, safety, liveness at a glance Delayed execution shifts the validator’s attestation bottleneck from “re-execute the whole block” to “check minimal conditions from the previous state,” improving propagation and allowing more aggressive gas targets without violating safety; actual state transitions still execute deterministically post-attestation. EIP-7886 Delayed-Exec explainer. oai_citation:3‡Ethereum Improvement Proposals oai_citation:4‡nerolation.github.io

“Proofs easy to download and verify” is already live at L2 ZK rollups submit succinct validity proofs and verify them on L1 via small on-chain verifiers, firmly decoupling heavy compute from light verification. This is a concrete precedent for L1 verification economics. Linea @ L2BEAT zkSync Era @ L2BEAT. oai_citation:5‡L2BEAT

Real-time proving: where costs and clusters land today Open benchmarks suggest “near-real-time” Ethereum block proving is feasible with sub- $1M GPU clusters: RISC Zero models ~9–12 s proofs with ~\$ 120k hardware; Succinct’s SP1 Hypercube projects >90 percent mainnet blocks in real time with ~~160×4090 GPUs (~~$300–400k bill of materials). Treat all figures as workload- and tuning-dependent and validate against your own traces. RISC Zero Succinct a16z crypto. oai_citation:6‡RISC Zero oai_citation:7‡Succinct oai_citation:8‡a16z crypto

EIPs touching gas limits and operator ergonomics A per-tx cap (EIP-7825) proposes 2^24 gas (~16.8M) to bound worst-case single-tx execution even as block gas limits rise; debate continues (vs the familiar ~30M block gas norm). Use caps + delayed execution to keep “billion-gas/s” ambitions compatible with decentralization. EIP-7825 Magicians thread. oai_citation:9‡Ethereum Improvement Proposals oai_citation:10‡Fellowship of Ethereum Magicians

Design sketch — fully validating nodes with zkVMs Host runs consensus + verifier; guest bytecode (zkVM) produces a proof witnessing correct EVM (or RISC-V EVM-compat) execution. Gossip verifies within ~slot latency; tracing/proving can exceed 1 s but does not block attestations under delayed execution. Multiple independent provers can aggregate sub-proofs (transactions or sub-blocks) and recurse to a block-level proof. EIP-7886 RISC Zero Succinct. oai_citation:11‡Ethereum Improvement Proposals oai_citation:12‡RISC Zero oai_citation:13‡Succinct

Operationalizing prover decentralization Adopt a K-of-N prover committee (e.g., K=3 of N=5) with client diversity principles: independent stacks, different circuits/backends, heterogeneous hardware. The social target mirrors staking client diversity goals (<33 percent per implementation). Publish proofs and receipts via a neutral hub such as EthProofs. clientdiversity.org EthProofs GitHub. oai_citation:14‡Client Diversity | Ethereum oai_citation:15‡GitHub

Where this lands on “scale and decentralization” • Scale: zk verification cost stays tiny as throughput grows; delayed execution removes execution from the attestation critical path. • Decentralization: caps, committees, and client diversity reduce correlated failure and keep validation within commodity limits. The trade-off to watch is prover centralization — mitigate with open clusters and multiple vendors. EIP-7886 a16z crypto. oai_citation:16‡Ethereum Improvement Proposals oai_citation:17‡a16z crypto

Useful references you named (decoded) EIPs 7732 and 7886 = PBS + delayed execution; EIP-7825 = per-tx gas cap (debated). “Verify gossip ~1 s” is the propagation goal unlocked by not re-executing on the critical path. EthProofs.org tracks “SNARKifying Ethereum.” L2BEAT pages document cheap verification today. EIP-7732 EIP-7886 EIP-7825 EthProofs GitHub L2BEAT. oai_citation:18‡Ethereum Improvement Proposals oai_citation:19‡GitHub oai_citation:20‡L2BEAT

Reality check before you promise numbers The “1 gigagas/s, 10k TPS” line is a directional vision, not a signed-off upgrade. Hardware costs, circuit choices, and network effects will determine whether real-time proving is routine or rare. Keep claims tied to EIPs in progress and to reproducible prover benchmarks. EthDaily a16z crypto. oai_citation:21‡ethdaily.io #+END_SRC